were generated by the agricultural crisis and the ensuing famine of 1920-21. To meet the needs of the urban population, the Bolsheviks decreed a forced food levy (December 14, 1920) by which peasants were ordered to deliver their entire surplus to the State. The peasants, retaliating in kind, produced little more than their own needs demanded. Scattered peasant uprisings, together with the Kronstadt rebellion early in 1921, combined to force a change of policy on the new regime. The strict codes of "War Communism" were abrogated and the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched. Delivery quotas were introduced (amounting to a tax-in-kind) and peasants were encouraged to produce for a flourishing free market.

Thus, for a time under NEP the peasants, who now controlled almost all the arable land, were permitted to enjoy the fruits of their revolutionary exertions. Agricultural production recovered rapidly and a degree of national prosperity resulted. But the Bolsheviks had paid a price for this prosperity — the restoration of free market relations between town and country.

The Leninist Dilemma

The unstable compromise of NEP postponed the inevitable clash between the "proletarian dictatorship" and the victorious peasant revolution. Two parallel developments were rapidly to hasten the impending struggle: throughout the NEP period (1921-28) the peasants tightened their hold on the land, many of them growing relatively prosperous, and thereby fortifying their gains. At the same time the Bolsheviks were tightening their hold on the political machinery of the State and turning their party into a monolithic organization capable of an outright offensive against the rest of the country. Thus, the stage was set for the gigantic economic struggle of the late twenties.

The issue at stake between the Bolsheviks and the peasantry was only partly ideological. The conflict between the Bolshevik belief in the superior efficacy of large-scale "socialist" farming and the peasants' allegiance to his traditional "way of life" was important, but this conflict was subordinated to another one which was economic in character. The peasants and the Bolshevik regime faced each other across the table on which the grain produce of Russia was negotiated. And it was, in fact, in the realm of economics

the leadership of the radical Alexander Stambouliski, took power after the war. Though his regime was overthrown by the reactionary Tsankov-Volkov *coup* of 1923, with every excess and barbarity, Stambouliski's premiership left a lasting social imprint. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe peasant parties were not strong enough to take the reigns of government, but the impact of the "green rising" was reflected everywhere in legislative activity.

In Romania about 50 per cent of the arable land (four million hectares) was transferred to peasant smallholders, reflecting the vigor of the 1907 uprising. In newly-created Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the reforms were less spectacular, but followed the same area-wide pattern. In these two countries the land reforms had a national as well as social character, the majority of the expropriated lands having been Hungarian and German properties.[8]

The same forces were at work in Poland where the issue of land reform was uppermost in the public consciousness at the time of the nation's reestablishment. Despite determined opposition from the land owning classes, limited land reforms were decreed in 1919 and 1920. But partly because the principle of total compensation was accepted, only two and a half million hectares were distributed among the peasants by 1938, only enough to satisfy the land hunger of approximately half the natural increase in population.[9]

In the entire region only Hungary resisted peasant demands for land reform. There the movement was effectively blocked, first by Bela Kun's temporary Communist dictatorship, and then by the Horthy reaction. The land structure that emerged from the post-war reforms is described in Chart IV.

As Chart IV indicates, the post-World War I reforms left much to be accomplished in the direction of equalizing the peasant land tenure. But from the Baltic to the Aegean the reforms signified

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[8] In Czechoslovakia 12 per cent of the arable land, or 1.7 million hectares, was distributed under the reform; in Yugoslavia 12.5 per cent of the arable land, or 1.8 million hectares, was distributed. The Yugoslav reforms were largely confined to Croatia and Slovenia, former provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

[9] Ferdynand Zweig, *Poland Between the Wars* (London, 1944), p. 130. Zweig's analysis of the national discussion of reform in the early 1920s is interesting, partly because so many of the arguments employed by those who opposed breaking up the large estates are those which are today used to justify the modern *kolkhoz*! This is true particularly of the argument that "self-sufficient small holdings are supposed to be unsuitable for compulsory deliveries in wartime." (p. 134).

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

tion of separate states. Therewith a tide of Liberalism merged with the currents of upsurging tribal nationalism to create the pattern of conflict which was later to prove so advantageous to the totalitarians. Czech nationalism, having in Thomas Masaryk a brilliantly effective standard-bearer, seemed at first blush to usher in a new era of democratic and progressive social thought. It soon became obvious, however, that the autonomism of the Czechs—which led at the outset even to the establishment of a National Church—would of necessity engender comparable feelings in the breasts of the other peoples in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks rallied round their own traditions of language and culture, and swiftly but surely became committed to a quest for autonomy which found a temporary though unsatisfactory haven under Hitler. Among Sudeten Germans feeling was almost as strong and led ultimately to the fateful formation of a political party which advocated union with Germany. Nor was the situation different elsewhere. Yugoslavia was plagued from the beginning by deep and bitter conflict among the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes.

In Hungary a violent Communist revolution, spearheaded in late 1918 by Béla Kun, ruled for a time by bloodshed. But ere long this uprising, which had very little popular support, was put down; reaction set in, and a dictatorial government was established after it had compiled its own catalogue of excesses. Here was made manifest, probably for the first time, how significant the stability of religious groups could prove to be. Not only did they temper noticeably the excesses of extremists, but under the leadership of great churchmen they began to build organizations dedicated to social improvement. It is also true that bitter experience under the Béla Kun regime made Hungary one of the most anti-Communist countries of Europe.

And so, as the turbulence engendered by the war apparently subsided, it seemed probable that a period of relative security

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642 by a parlimentary facade. Workers' parties, peasant parties
661 and trade unions were all persecuted or forbidden, strikes were
728 suppressed in blood, and brutal mass executions were not unknown. To give only one example, 20-30 thousand workers and peasants lost their lives after the overthrow of the Peasant Government of Alexander Stamboliisky in Bulgaria in 1923. The secret police of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could boast of rivalling the Gestapo in all the refinements of torture. The press was gagged. Parliamentary elections were a farce, as votes were bought, electors were terrorized, and voting was open, although the counting of the votes was secret. It was no accident that in only one out of the many national elections held in Rumania between the two world wars, did the government that was called upon by the king to arrange the elections fail to get the expected majority! The corruption and depravity of the public administration was immense. Symbolical of this corruption was King Carol's notorious mistress, Magda Lupescu, who appointed and dismissed Ministers and high officials, distributed government contracts, etc. National minorities in general, and the Jews in particular, suffered from official oppression and from 'spontaneous' outbursts of hooliganism organised by government agents. The alliance with Hitlerite Germany of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and many of the rulers of Yugoslavia seemed natural.

In view of these facts, it is not surprising that the collapse of the German military machine was greeted with joy by the overwhelming majority of the peoples of Eastern Europe, who hoped to get rid of the previous shameful political and social order. The breakdown of the Gestapo unleashed a tremendous. independent upsurge of the people. The first task of the Russian occupation authorities was to grapple with this mass activity.

Bulgaria

● 669 In Sofia and other towns armed workers arrested fascists
642 *en masse*, held mass demonstrations, set up elected people's
728 tribunals, disarmed the police and established a workers' militia. Local committees took over the administration and the red flag was hoisted over all public buildings. The ferment was equally great in the Bulgarian army. Thus *The Economist* of October 7th, 1944, could write:

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'Reports on the Bulgarian forces of occupation in Western Thrace and Macedonia vividly recall the picture of the Russian army in 1917. Soldiers' councils have been set up, officers have been degraded, red flags hoisted, and normal saluting has been abolished.'

But the Russian and Bulgarian Communist leaders did not welcome the initiative of the masses. On the contrary, they did everything to stop 'anarchy' and restore 'order'. When Molotov met the Bulgarian armistice delegation, he made the following declaration: 'If certain Communists continue their present conduct, we will bring them to reason. Bulgaria will remain with her democractic Government and her present order . . . You must retain all valuable army officers from before the *coup d'etat*. You should reinstate in service all officers who have been dismissed for various reasons'. (*The New York Times*, January 16th, 1945). And earlier, on September 21st, 1944, *The New York Times* correspondent in Sofia reported that 'Communist leaders are doing everything they can to prevent extremists in the party from agitating for sovietization of the country'. Of the Red Army he said: 'On several occasions when local Communists in the provinces tried to displace city officials and take matters into their own hands they were ordered by the Russian military authorities to return the jobs to the old officials until orders were received from the Fatherland Front Government in Sofia'. The Fatherland Front government hastened to establish order.

As regards the restoration of 'order' in the Bulgarian Army, the same article in *The Economist* states: 'M. Velchev (Minister of War in the Fatherland Front Government—Y.G.) has issued a stern order to the troops to return immediately to normal discipline, to abolish Soldiers' Councils and to hoist no more red flags. Now Sofia reports that the Bulgarian army has been placed under the supreme command of Marshal Tolbukhin. Apparently, the Soviet commander has no patience with Balkan repetitions of 1917 . . . The Bulgarian Left seems to be ready to accept this policy, but it may be questioned whether it would have agreed to it so easily if its author had been Colonel Velchev and not Marshal Tolbukhin.'

In its programme, the Fatherland Front Government was careful to emphasize that it stood for the social *status quo* and

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728 642 669 for the maintenance of private property. Immediately after its establishment, the Communist leader, Anton Yugov, the Minister of the Interior, declared: 'This government, of which I am a member and on whose behalf I speak, categorically denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime in Bulgaria. There is no truth in rumours that the government intends to nationalise any private enterprise in the country.' (*The New York Times*, 22nd September, 1944).

642 471 A few months later, at the national congress of the Fatherland Front in March, 1945, another Communist leader declared: 'We are building a democractic country based on private property and private initiative. Consequently the Government by its very nature is reformist.' He severely attacked those members of the Communist Party who opposed the Fatherland Front Government and wanted 'to establish a completely Communist government.' An article in the official paper of the Fatherland Front, *Otechestven Front* (9th March, 1945) described the programme of the Front in these words: 'It is the programme of the Bulgarian workers, peasants, craftsmen and women, honest, intellectual, patriotic individuals, industrialists, merchants and patriotic soldiers.' In a congress of the industrialists of Bulgaria on September 27th, 1945, a Communist Minister, Dobri Terpeshev, said on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council: 'Private initiative will not be handicapped but supported. The Communists intend to revive it because our economy needs your initiative . . . Let us all work without being led on by thought of gain alone.' A year later the Communist Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov, declared: 'The immediate task is neither the realisation of Socialism nor the introduction of the Soviet system but the consolidation of a truly democratic and Parliamentarian system.'

642 661 From September, 1944, to October, 1946, the Fatherland Front Government was headed by General Kimon Georgiev who not only played a leading part in the military, semi-fascist *coup d'etat* of Tsankov in 1923, as a result of which tens of thousands of workers and peasants were massacred, but was also the author of the military coup of 1934 which led to the immediate dismissal of Parliament, the terrible persecution of Communists, Agrarians and others, and, for the first time in

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CHAPTER II

POLAND: THE WARSAW UPRISING

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THE OPPOSITION of Russia and its agents to any spontaneous, independent and democratic action by the masses was revealed in the most damning way when the people of Warsaw, organised and led in the main by the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.), rose in arms against the German Army of Occupation. Russia's attitude towards the heroic uprising shows up the sinister and anti-democratic character of her policy during the critical stages of the process by which the Communists took control of the state machine. 669

In July, 1944, the Soviet Army advanced towards Warsaw, and in the second half of the month, German troops began to be evacuated *en masse* from the city and its environs. On 29th July the Soviet Army under the command of Marshal Rokossovsky entered Otwock, 20 kilometres from Warsaw. The next day they reached Miłosna, 10 kilometres from Warsaw. On 31st July, mobile patrols of the Soviet Army had advanced as far as Praga, a suburb of Warsaw on the east bank of the Vistula. Every night military targets in Warsaw were bombed by the Soviet air force. The Germans continued to withdraw their exhausted troops, but held on to the eastern end of the bridges in Praga. Then the Russian artillery began to bombard Praga. The Vistula was crossed near its confluence with the Pilica and this threatened the German garrison from the south, while on 1st and 2nd August the Vistula was crossed higher up near Sandomierz.

The situation in Warsaw itself was described thus: 'The Germans were evacuating Warsaw at high speed. Railway installations and industrial plants were dismantled and removed . . . All the German offices in the city, including the Post Office, closed down. Newspapers published by the Germans ceased. The Gestapo burned documents in the

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669 greatest haste and prepared to decamp . . . German civilians besieged the railway stations. On account of the inadequate number of trains, they fled by all possible means of transport, offering sky-high prices for the hire of a horse and cart'. (T. Bor-Komorowski, *The Secret Army*, London, 1950, p. 206).

The Germans ordered the mobilization of 100,000 Poles for the fortification of the suburbs of Warsaw, but not a single Pole presented himself. A Soviet broadcast reported later that prior to the last week in July 'a tense atmosphere could be felt in Warsaw. The Germans, it was said, were obviously preparing a new massacre of the population'. (Statement by Colonel Tarnawa, a Polish officer, who was in Warsaw at that time, Soviet Home Service, September 2nd, 1944. Quoted by the Duchess of Atholl, *The Tragedy of Warsaw and its Documentation*, London, 1945).

During this period the Polish organisation which acted as the mouthpiece of the Kremlin—the Union of Polish Patriots—issued increasingly urgent appeals to the population of Warsaw to rise and fight the Germans. On July 29th, Radio Moscow broadcast an appeal of the Union: 'Appeal to Warsaw. Fight the Germans. No doubt Warsaw already hears the guns of the battle which is soon to bring her liberation. Those who have never bowed their heads to Hitlerite power will again, as in 1939, join battle with the Germans, this time for the decisive action.

' . . . For Warsaw, which did not yield but fought on, the hour of action has already arrived.

'The Germans will no doubt try to defend themselves in Warsaw. . . It is therefore a hundred times more necessary than ever to remember that in the flood of Hitlerite destruction all is lost that is not saved by active effort, that by direct active struggle in the streets of Warsaw, in its houses, factories, and stores we not only hasten the moment of final liberation but also save a nation's property and the lives of our brothers.'

On July, 30th, the radio station of the Union of Polish Patriots, Radio Kościuszko, declared: 'Warsaw trembles from the roar of guns. The Soviet armies are pushing forward and are near Praga. They come to us to bring us liberation. The Germans, when pushed out from Praga, will attempt to hold

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Warsaw and will try to destroy everything. In Bialystok they sacked everything for six days. They murdered thousands of our brothers. We must do everything to avoid a repetition of these horrors in Warsaw. People of Warsaw, to arms!''Attack the Germans . . . Assist the Red Army in crossing the Vistula'. (*Manchester Guardian*, 22nd August, 1944). 669 ●

On 1st August, Warsaw rose against the Germans. Women and children took their place among the fighters. Although poorly armed, with only home-made mortars and hand grenades, the people of Warsaw fought heroically, and by the 3rd the insurgents had control of the greater part of Warsaw.

On 2nd August, the Germans launched a counter-attack against the Soviet Army and on the eastern and north-eastern fronts drove it back to a distance of 50 miles from Warsaw (where the Soviet Army remained until 28th August). But on the south-east of Warsaw the Soviet Army maintained its position at a distance of some 15 miles from the city. The retreat of the Soviet Army made it impossible for it to give immediate direct support to the Warsaw insurgents. But it was in a position to do a great deal to help them. The Luftwaffe had been bombing the town incessantly since August 4th, and Soviet fighters could have intercepted the German bombers, and Soviet bombers could have bombed both the airfields from which the German bombers took off and the gun sites from which the Germans bombarded the city. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. could have supplied the insurgents with the arms they needed so desperately.

On 5th August, a Soviet officer of the Intelligence Service, Captain Constantin Kalugin, was sent to the insurgents' headquarters in Warsaw. He despatched the following telegram to Moscow (via the British authorities in London, reaching Moscow on 8th August):

'Comrade Marshal Stalin, Moscow. On 5th August, 1944, established personal contact with the commander of the Warsaw garrison who is leading the heroic struggle of the Polish nation against the Hitlerite bandits. After acquainting myself with the general military situation, have come to the conclusion that in spite of the heroism of the army and entire population, there are certain difficulties to be overcome if we are to hasten on the victory over our common foe. The needs

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● 669 are as follows: motorised weapons, ammunition, grenades and anti-tank guns.

'Places for dropping arms by parachute: Wilson Square, Invalids' Square, the Ghetto, Krasinskis' Square, Iron Gate Square, Napoleon Square, the Mokotow Field, the Light Cavalry barracks, Bielany.

'Recognition signals: white and red sheets.

'German aircraft are causing destruction in the town and among the civilian population. Bomb from the air the bridges over the Vistula in the Warsaw area, the Saxony Park and Jerusalem Avenue, Wolska Road, where the enemy troops are concentrated. Bomb the aerodromes of Okecie and of Bielany. The population of Warsaw hopes that you will come to their help within the next few hours. Help me to come in touch with Marshal Rokossovsky. Captain [Constantin Kalugin of the Czarny Group, Warsaw, 66.804'. (Z. Zaremba, *Powstanie Sierpniowe*, London, 1946, pp. 30–32).

All the appeals of the insurgents to Moscow for arms, for fighter aircraft to be sent to defend Warsaw from the terrible bombardment, and for the German airfields and gun sites to be bombed were in vain. The Soviet Air Force which throughout August and September occupied airfields only a few minutes' flight from the city and which, until the insurrection, regularly bombed military targets in Warsaw, now completely ceased activity in and around Warsaw.

Moscow's very lame excuse for not sending arms to the insurgents was the danger that the arms dropped would fall into the hands of the Germans. At a foreign press conference in Lublin on August 28th, General Michal Rola-Zymierski, Commander of the Polish forces under the high command of the Red Army, said: 'If the insurgents had one entire district, it would be possible to help them, but when they held only isolated buildings, everything must fall into German hands'. (*The Daily Worker*, August 30th). This explanation is proved to be specious by Captain Kalugin's telegram cited above, by *The Times* statement that it was the Germans who held only 'widely scattered islands' and above all by the fact that in the middle of September, when the area in the hands of the insurgents was much smaller, Russian arms were dropped in Warsaw.

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Another excuse for the Kremlin's policy was put forward by Anna Louise Strong (for twenty-three years an apologist for Russian policy, but since 'purged' as an 'American spy') in an article in *The Nation* of September 2nd, 1944: 'The Red Army thus far has taken many cities, some by storm and more by outflanking, but the Red Army never took a city by the correlation of a frontal attack with an uprising within the city. The Red Army always discouraged such tactics'. That is the revolutionary Red Army!

From 4th August, British and American planes based in Italy began to reach Warsaw—a flight there and back of 1,300 miles. Such a distance was beyond the range of fighter cover, so that the flights had to take place at night, thus increasing the number of casualties and detracting from their effectiveness. For only three days did the R.A.F. supply Warsaw adequately. After that only single planes reached the city from time to time. It was evident that 'if the (Allied) planes, after dropping their loads, could fly on the short distances to behind the Russian lines and "shuttle" back, the operation would be far easier, and the casualties far lighter'. (*Daily Herald*, 30th August, 1944). Such a 'shuttle' service already existed elsewhere. British and American planes bombing the Rumanian oilfields, Koenigsberg, Gdynia and other German centres, used to come down in Russian-held territory. But *forty days* elapsed before Moscow agreed to allow these planes to carry supplies to besieged Warsaw or to bomb German bases in the city and its surroundings, and then to fly behind the Russian lines and 'shuttle' back, or even to allow damaged British and American planes to land on Russian-held airfields.

On 14th September, the Soviet Army occupied Praga and in the next three days they forced the Germans back a number of miles to the north-west. Soviet planes cleared the sky above Warsaw of German planes, and began to drop arms and food. But after a few days there was another sudden change in Russian policy. The Soviet Army holding Praga halted, its artillery ceased fire, its aeroplanes disappeared almost entirely and the Luftwaffe reopened its murderous attacks. Occasional consignments of arms and food were the only help given by the Russians. The Soviet Army which occupied the eastern quarters

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●669 of Warsaw for another month stood by while the German army murdered the Warsaw rebels.

After a heroic and unequal struggle lasting 63 days Warsaw fell. 240,000 of its inhabitants were killed and 630,000 deported by the Germans. The city was destroyed systematically, house by house and street by street.

During the period of the uprising, any Polish partisans who tried to reach besieged Warsaw were stopped by the Soviet Army, disarmed and arrested. (Altogether the Russian army arrested 50,000 of the Polish partisans fighting the German army and deported them to Siberia).

The Communists use two main arguments to justify Russian policy towards the uprising: first, that it was ill-timed, and secondly, that it had a reactionary character.

The first argument is belied by the appeals, quoted above, sent out by Radio Moscow to the population of Warsaw to rise, and by the fact that the Soviet liaison officers who were sent to Warsaw at the beginning of the uprising (of whom Captain Kalugin was one) supported the rising unreservedly. Further, the small group of Communists in Warsaw itself declared in favour of the uprising. The official Communist organ *Armia Ludowa* stated on 15th August: 'The armed uprising has found the support of the broadest masses of Warsaw's people, quite independently of who started it and for what purpose, and that is its strength.' (This, incidentally, is in sharp contrast to the ridicule which the Communist papers in Moscow, London and New York heaped on the uprising). Seventeen days after the beginning of the uprising the Kościuszko radio station declared its support: 'Our camp, the camp of fighting democracy, has always welcomed any sign of fighting against the German invader. We have always called you to arms and have seen in an active struggle the surest means of saving men and national property. We see in the present rising in Warsaw a manifestation of the fighting spirit of the democratic camp and the Warsaw fighting is to us as sacred as any act of combat against the enemy'. Two days later the Lublin radio of the Union of Polish Patriots proclaimed: 'The Warsaw uprising proves the fighting spirit of the democratic camp. Our (Polish—Y.G.) infantry burns with the desire to help Warsaw. Also the soldiers of the Red Army are hurrying to assist the capital.

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Warsaw will be liberated . . . Polish soldiers and the Red Army are coming to assist you.' (Quoted by L. M. Oak in the American *New Leader*, November, 13th, 1944).

Even more monstrous than the description of the rising as untimely is its condemnation as reactionary and fascist in character. If the Warsaw uprising had really been reactionary the Kremlin's attitude to it would have been very different. It is enough to recall the goodwill manifested to General Béla Miklós of Hungary and King Michael of Rumania. Russia was hostile to the Warsaw uprising precisely because it was quite independent of Communist influence, was dominated by the P.P.S. and was a socially progressive movement.

After the military defeat of September, 1939, which marked the disintegration of the dictatorial semi-fascist regime of the 'Colonels', the workers and peasants, organised in the P.P.S. and in the Peasant Party, became the backbone of the underground army, called Armia Krajowa (A.K.), the Home Army. The extreme right did not belong to the A.K. but to the National Armed Forces (Narodowe Sily Zbrojne). Military units of the P.P.S. and the Polish Peasant Party joined the A.K. and retained their identity as autonomous units. The clandestine parliament—the Council of National Unity—relied mainly on the workers and peasants.

The programme of the Home Army was described in its underground organ, *Biuletyn Informacyjny* of 9th September, 1943, in an article entitled 'What Kind of Poland are we Fighting for?' This clearly stated that the future Poland must have 'freedom of speech, freedom of opinion, freedom of association; it will be a Poland of social justice and welfare for the wide masses, liberated from capitalistic chaos; a Poland which will nationalise its great factories and plants; a Poland which will fundamentally transform its agrarian regime, modernize its system of distributing goods, expand its network of co-operatives and industrialize the country'.

On 15th August, 1944, after the Warsaw Commune's 15 days' existence, the Council of National Unity issued a manifesto to the people which included the following statement:

'In this war, Poland is not only fighting for her existence and political independence, but also for loftier aims. The Atlantic Charter, which defined the military aims of the United Nations,

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185 assures to Poland its legitimate aspirations and its historic
● 669 needs. Threatened by repeated aggression of imperialist Powers, she must be certain of security and the possibility of working in peace for generations. She wants to be able to govern herself according to her own principles and laws. These principles have already been published in the declaration of 26th July, 1944. They guarantee the regime of the future Republic based on political liberty and social justice.

'The principles of the Polish democratic Republic are as follows:

'1. A constitution guaranteeing governments in accordance with the will of the people.

'2. A democratic electoral law faithfully reflecting public opinion through general and municipal elections.

'3. Agrarian reform covering all estates of over 50 hectares as well as German landed property determined by a preliminary decree; the surplus population being directed towards industry and handicrafts.

'4. Socialisation of key industries.

'5. Participation of the workers in the management of enterprise and control by the workers of industrial production.

'6. All citizens have the right to work and to a decent standard of living.

'7. A just redistribution of the social income.

'8. All citizens have the right to education and culture.' (Zaremba, *La Commune de Varsovie* (Fel.) Paris, 1947, pp. 39-40).

Although the Warsaw uprising had basically a national-liberatory and social revolutionary character, it nevertheless had many negative, reactionary elements in its leadership. The P.P.S. leaders, with their inclination to compromise, and in the name of 'national unity', agreed to keep the military leadership in the hands of army experts headed by General Bor-Komorowski. The Russian Government let Hitler murder the rebels of Warsaw, not because their commander came from the old Polish Army, but because the rebellion was an expression of new forces, nationally and socially independent of the Kremlin.